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Oakley: Sunday Ticket: The Ninth Circuit's Expansion of the Quick Look Te

SUNDAY TICKET: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S EXPANSION OF
THE QUICK LOOK TEST COULD INCIDENTALLY
HELP FANS WATCH MORE FOOTBALL
FOR LESS MONEY
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the expansion of the National Football League’s
(“NFL”) regular season, roughly twenty million people tuned in to
watch a NFL game on any given Sunday.1 The addition of an eighteenth week to the 2021 regular season will only increase revenue
generated from viewership.2 With thirty-three of these games being
within the top fifty highest rated telecasts of 2020, these Sunday
traditions generate incredible revenue for the NFL and its teams.3
These millions of fans are either watching the games through their
local televeision network or a subscription to the NFL and
DirectTV’s Sunday Ticket Package (“Sunday Ticket”).4 Sunday
Ticket is a satellite broadcasting deal between the NFL and
DirectTV, where DirectTV has the exclusive right to broadcast the
individual telecasts of all NFL games being played on Sunday
(“NFL-DirectTV Agreement”).5 Fox, CBS, and NBC produce the
1. See Brad Adgate, In 2020 the Audience of NFL Regular Season Games Dropped,
FORBES (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bradadgate/2021/01/08/in2020-the-audience-of-nfl-regular-season-games-dropped/?sh=1d90d5ac7482
[https://web.archive.org/web/20211221184852/https://www.forbes.com/sites/
bradadgate/2021/01/08/in-2020-the-audience-of-nfl-regular-season-gamesdropped/?sh=1d90d5ac7482] (noting early afternoon games averaged 18.1 million
viewers while later afternoon games averaged 23.2 million viewers).
2. See Jacob Camenker, NFL Expanded Schedule, Explained: How a 17-game Season
Will Work with Byes, Playoffs & More, SPORTINGNEWS (Sept. 7, 2021), https://
www.sportingnews.com/us/nfl/news/nfl-schedule-explained-17-game-season/
1ru5blwza8uak1n8voezty9gl7 [https://perma.cc/LM5X-PZC3] (discussing why
NFL expanded its regular season, plus impact it will have on teams, viewers).
3. See Adgate, supra note 1 (noting NFL can expand on dominating fifty highest rated telecasts because NFL announced 2021 regular season will be eighteen
weeks).
4. See Matt Johnson, Report: NFL to Begin Negotiating New Media Deals, Could Be
Finalized by End of Year, SPORTSNAUT (Mar. 24, 2020), https://sportsnaut.com/
2020/03/report-nfl-to-begin-negotiating-new-media-deals-could-be-finalized-byend-of-year/#:~:text=doesn’t%20expire%20until%20the,deals%20before%20the
%20year%20ends [https://perma.cc/MD4X-64RX] (discussing there could be
more options to watch Sunday afternoon games after current round of media
contracts).
5. See Babette Boliek, Antitrust, Regulation, and the “New” Rules of Sports Telecasts, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 501, 537–38 (2014) (advocating DirectTV’s exclusive deal
with NFL makes it better option than cable television).
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individual NFL game telecasts for cable broadcasting pursuant to
an exclusive network agreement (“NFL-Network Agreement”).6
The NFL may enter into agreements on behalf of the NFL teams
because the thirty-two independent teams agreed to pool their licensing rights, and gave the NFL the authority to exercise those
rights (“NFL-Teams Agreement”).7
The NFL-Network Agreement and NFL-Teams Agreement
work together to limit viewers’ access to two or three local telecasts
of games every Sunday.8 For example, a San Francisco 49ers fan
who lives in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, would be unable to watch
the 49ers play on free cable television unless the game was played
within the fan’s geographic location, or if it was the nationally televised Sunday Night Football game.9 Free games provided over
cable television are limited to local games in a given geographic
area.10 If fans want to watch an out-of-market game, they have to
purchase Sunday Ticket for about $359 per year to view those
games via satellite broadcasts.11 Commercial subscribers pay between $1458 and over $120,000 for a full season of Sunday Ticket.12
The $1.5 billion contract for Sunday Ticket is set to expire in
2022.13 With new deals on the line, the NFL has the potential to
double its annual revenue from media rights from about $7.5 billion to $15 billion.14 The new TV rights agreements are set to last
6. See Johnson, supra note 4 (observing exclusive deal with Fox, CBS, NBC is
set to expire after 2022 NFL football season).
7. See Nat’l Football League’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig. v. DirecTV, LLC,
933 F.3d 1136, 1148 (9th Cir. 2019) [hereinafter Sunday Ticket II] (explaining by
giving NFL authority to exercise pooled licensing rights, individual teams cannot
enter contracts “with networks, satellite TV providers, or internet streaming
services”).
8. See id. (discussing how fans are prevented from watching seven to ten additional games on Sunday without Sunday Ticket).
9. See id. (noting how fan in Los Angeles would be able to watch three games
on Sundays at most).
10. See id. (detailing how fans cannot subscribe to individual team’s telecast,
fans must purchase entire package).
11. See In re NFL Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., No. ML-15-02668-BRO
(JEMx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121354, at *9 (C.D. Cal. 2017) [hereinafter Sunday
Ticket I] (stating amount of $359 was price for 2015), rev’d, 933 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir.
2019).
12. See id. (noting prices increased about 11.5% from 2014 season for individuals, commercial subscribers).
13. See John Ourand, NFL Presses Toward Massive New Media Deals, with Formal
Negotiations Near, SPORTS BUS. DAILY (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.sportsbusiness
daily.com/Journal/Issues/2020/03/23/Sports-and-Society/NFL-mediaCV.aspx
[https://perma.cc/ZGM4-LPR5] (stating even amongst uncertainty with
coronavirus, NFL plans to finalize new deals with TV networks by end of 2020).
14. See Alex Sherman, Here’s How NFL TV Rights Are Expected to Shake Out for the
Rest of the Decade, According to Sources, CNBC (Feb. 23, 2020), https://
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ten years, securing the NFL a steady stream of revenue.15 While the
NFL has not found a host for Sunday Ticket, the NFL signed yearly
deals of $1 billion with Amazon, $2.1 billion with CBS, $2.7 billion
with ESPN, $2.2 billion with Fox and $2 billion with NBC.16
Through all of its new long term media deals, the NFL is estimated
to receive $105 billion in revenue over the next 10 years.17
DirectTV has been clear it does not intend to renew the contract for exclusive rights to Sunday Ticket.18 While DirectTV identified underperformance of the exclusive package as justification for
not wanting to renew Sunday Ticket, one can only wonder if a recent class action suit has deterred, or at least helped discourage,
DirectTV from renewing its deal with the NFL.19 In National Football
League’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litigation v. DirecTV, LLC,20 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned dismissal of the lawsuit
where bars, restaurants, and other retail establishments claimed the
NFL, the NFL teams, and DirectTV violated antitrust laws through
their exclusive Sunday Ticket agreement.21 Shortly after the Ninth
Circuit remanded the case back to the district court, the NFL and
www.cnbc.com/2020/02/22/nfl-tv-rights-up-for-renewal-in-2022-and-big-mediawill-pay-more.html [https://perma.cc/27MF-DFZ4] (describing how tech giants
like Amazon or Apple will be competing against traditional media companies, giving NFL leverage in negotiations over prices for broadcast rights).
15. See Andrew Marchand, NFL’s Monster TV Deals with Networks, Amazon Will
Surpass $100B, N.Y. POST (Dec. 16, 2020), https://nypost.com/2020/12/16/nflsmonster-tv-deals-with-networks-amazon-will-surpass-100b/ [https://perma.cc/
4F7B-FAYC] (reporting NFL currently generates $10 billion per year in broadcast
revenue).
16. See Jimmy Traina, NFL Inks Massive TV Deals, Promptly Undergoes Rounds of
Layoffs: TRAINA THOUGHTS, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jul. 15, 2021), https://
www.si.com/extra-mustard/2021/07/15/nfl-media-undergoes-massive-layoffs
[https://perma.cc/PF52-MDG8] (observing NFL closed on these media contracts
in late March 2021).
17. See Christopher Palmeri, NFL Signs $105 Billion TV Deal, With Amazon Taking Thursdays, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2021-03-18/nfl-signs-historic-tv-deal-with-amazon-taking-thursday-rights#:~:
text=NFL%20Signs%20%24105%20Billion%20TV%20Deal%2C%20With%20Amazon%20Taking%20Thursdays%20%2D%20Bloomberg [https://perma.cc/9YA9ZSB8] (describing new deals NFL entered into, allowing NFL to essentially double
its revenue).
18. See Tom Bassam, Report: NFL Sunday Ticket Likely to be Primarily a Streaming
Offer in Next Cycle, S P O R T S P R O M E D I A (Nov. 25, 2020), https://
www.sportspromedia.com/news/nfl-sunday-ticket-tv-rights-streaming-directv-amazon-espn-peacock-dazn [https://perma.cc/Y8G2-2L3W] (suggesting NFL has not
engaged in official negotiations with anyone else for Sunday Ticket).
19. See id. (stating NFL viewership is up 17% from last year).
20. Nat’l Football League’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig. v. DirecTV, LLC,
933 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2019).
21. For further discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, see infra notes 165
200 and accompanying text.
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DirectTV put a pause on litigation and petitioned the Supreme
Court to take the issue.22
As the NFL pushed forward with new media deals, the Supreme Court decided to not entertain the NFL’s petition regarding
the ongoing class action suit against the NFL and DirectTV for conspiring to restrain trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.23 Justice Kavanaugh issued a detached opinion explaining the Court’s
denial of certiorari should not be viewed as an endorsement of the
Ninth Circuit’s rationale.24 Rather, Justice Kavanaugh explained
the Supreme Court denied taking the case because the case is at the
motion to dismiss stage, before discovery and further factual development needs to occur.25 Accordingly, the case is now back to the
District Court for the Central District of California, where the parties have agreed to a trial date of February 20, 2024.26 Notably,
DirectTV will not be a party to the trial because its agreements with
Sunday Ticket customers included an operative arbitration clause
that was upheld by the district court.27
In Sunday Ticket II, while the Ninth Circuit did not find that the
NFL’s exclusive agreement with DirecTV violated antitrust law, the
court held that Plaintiffs’ claims had survived the motion to dismiss
stage and could proceed through further litigation.28 The court
held that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged market control and harm to
competition primarily because of the naked restriction on the out22. For further discussion of Sunday Ticket II’s procedural background, see
infra notes 37–61 and accompanying text.
23. See Philip Babler & James McKeown, Supreme Court Takes a Pass on Early
Review of Antitrust Challenge to NFL Sunday Ticket, JD SUPRA (Nov. 19, 2020), https://
www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/supreme-court-takes-a-pass-on-early-60222/ [https://
perma.cc/3AEN-P7CY] (discussing why Supreme Court’s rejection does not mark
victory for consumers).
24. See Nat’l Football League v. Ninth Inning, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 56, 57 (2020)
(Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari) (“I write separately simply to explain that the denial of certiorari should not necessarily be viewed as
agreement with the legal analysis of the Court of Appeals.”).
25. See id. at 56 (“Ordinarily, a decision of such legal and economic significance might warrant this Court’s review.”).
26. See Eriq Gardner, NFL’s TV Future May Be Decided by 2024 Jury Trial,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/
nfls-tv-future-may-be-decided-by-2024-jury-trial [https://perma.cc/4YV6-9XPC]
(reasoning settlement could happen before trial because parties will have plenty of
time for discovery).
27. See Eriq Gardner, DirectTV Forces “Sunday Ticket” Dispute Into Arbitration,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/business/
business-news/directv-forces-sunday-ticket-dispute-into-arbitration-4169904/
[https://perma.cc/9HNX-QLA4] (noting any legal actions against DirectTV will
be separately arbitrated before trial against NFL).
28. See Babler & McKeown, supra note 23 (suggesting NFL could prevail at
summary judgment or trial after discovery).
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put of football game telecasts.29 While consumers hope the decision will lead to cheaper access to out-of-market games, the
Chamber of Commerce for the United States, expert antitrust economists, and antitrust lawyers disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s application of the quick look test to an integrated joint venture whose
core activity was the marketing of licensed media.30
This Casenote asserts the Ninth Circuit erroneously lowered
the applicable standard of review for antitrust claim—making the
Ninth Circuit the most sympathetic jurisdiction to hear antitrust
claims—because the court extended the quick look test to include
integrated joint ventures.31 Section II provides the factual and procedural framework surrounding the Ninth Circuit’s decision.32 Section III provides legal background with a discussion of the history of
antitrust law and the NFL, the Sherman Act, and the different standards of review.33 Section IV analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s decision
and assesses its reasoning for the quick look test’s expanded applications.34 Section V discusses the quick look test’s inapplicability to
joint ventures.35 Lastly, Section VI discusses the potential impacts
the Ninth Circuit’s decision will have on the NFL’s ongoing negotiations for Sunday Ticket and future litigants bringing antitrust
claims.36
II. FACTS
In Sunday Ticket I, the District Court for the Central District of
California determined whether Plaintiffs’ Section 1 claims under
29. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d 1136, 1152 (9th Cir. 2019) (acknowledging
restrictions alleged in complaint are similar to restrictions Supreme Court has
found to be injury to competition).
30. See Mike Leonard, NFL Gets Allies in Bid to Have SCOTUS Stop Sunday Ticket
Suit, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/
X2104Q9S000000?bna_news_filter=mergers-and-antitrust&jcsearch
=BNA%2520000001716025d954aff5ebb5a1880001#jcite [https://perma.cc/6KTNTBDF] (reporting United States Chamber of Commerce, expert antitrust economists, antitrust lawyers all filed amicus briefs in support of NFL).
31. For further discussion of how the Ninth Circuit expanded the quick look
test, see infra notes 201-215 and accompanying text.
32. For further discussion of the factual and procedural background, see infra
notes 36–61 and accompanying text.
33. For further discussion of the legal background, see infra notes 62–164 and
accompanying text.
34. For further discussion of a narrative analysis of the decision, see infra
notes 165 200 and accompanying text.
35. For further discussion of a critical analysis of the decision, see infra notes
201-223 and accompanying text.
36. For further discussion of the impact of the decision, see infra notes 224243 and accompanying text.
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the Sherman Act were sufficient to survive Defendants’ motion to
dismiss.37 Furthermore, the district court considered and denied
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend their complaint.38 Plaintiffs
alleged Defendants violated Section 1 by agreeing to restrict competition in the licensing and distribution of live broadcasts of NFL
games to increase consumer prices.39 Additionally, Plaintiffs alleged Defendants violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act “by monopolizing the live video presentation of regular season NFL games
and making DirecTV the only source for the majority of NFL
games.”40
With the NFL-DirecTV Agreement in dispute, the district court
underwent a factual inquiry to determine the nature of how the
agreement operates.41 The court found that under the NFL Teams
Agreement, the thirty-two NFL teams agreed to pool licensing
rights and grant the NFL the right to negotiate broadcasting and
network deals.42 Furthermore, the court held that the NFL can
enter into network contracts on behalf of the NFL teams only if the
teams ratify the contracts by vote.43
Under the NFL-Network Agreement, the NFL, the teams, CBS,
and Fox team together to produce one telecast for every Sunday

37. See Sunday Ticket I, No. ML-15-02668-BRO (JEMx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
121354, at *18 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (noting in deciding motion to dismiss, court
should discount conclusory statements; where court grants motion to dismiss,
court should allow leave to amend unless complaint cannot clearly be saved by
amendment). See id. at *1 (reporting Plaintiffs in this action are Ninth Inning Inc.,
Third Avenue Restaurant Corp., Robert Gary Lippincott, Jr., Michael Holinko (collectively “Plaintiffs”). The Defendants in this action are the thirty-two individual
NFL teams, the NFL, various DirecTV entities, CBS Corporation (“CBS”), Fox
Broadcasting Company (“Fox”), NBCUniversal Media, LLC (“NBC”), and ESPN,
Inc. (“ESPN”) (collectively “Defendants”). See id. at *1 (detailing parties to class
action lawsuit).
38. See id. at *65 (discussing “bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the plaintiff has previously amended
the complaint” as factors courts consider in deciding whether to grant leave to
amend).
39. See id. at *11–12 (noting NFL, NFL teams do not have similar restrictive
licensing agreements for satellite or cable providers in Canada).
40. Id. at *12 (detailing Plaintiffs’ allegations surrounding Defendants’ monopolization of live broadcasts).
41. For further discussion of how the NFL agreements work together, see infra notes 42–48 and accompanying text.
42. See Sunday Ticket I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121354, at *6 (acknowledging
NFL exercised those rights by entering into contracts with five networks).
43. See id. at *8 (observing individual NFL teams are not passive actors in networks negotiations).
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football game.44 Additionally, the NFL-Network Agreement stipulates the NFL owns the copyright of the telecasts.45 The NFL works
with the networks to determine where games are broadcasted, usually limiting the telecasts of games to one game “at a time in any
given location or market.”46 Since 1994, the NFL and DirectTV
have had an exclusive agreement, where DirectTV provides subscribers of Sunday Ticket access to telecasts of Sunday football
games, both in-market and out-of-market.47 The NFL-DirectTV
Agreement grants DirectTV access to all of Fox’s and CBS’s football
game telecasts and allows it to redistribute the live telecasts via satellite broadcasting to Sunday Ticket subscribers.48
Ultimately, the district court granted Defendants’ motion to
dismiss on both Sherman Act claims.49 For the Section 1 claim, the
court held that Plaintiffs failed to plead facts showing anticompetitive harm, did not have antitrust standing to challenge the horizontal agreement, and did not plead a viable market in which
Defendants have power to restrain.50 For the Section 2 claim, the
44. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d 1136, 1148 (9th Cir. 2019) (detailing CBS,
Fox are permitted to broadcast some games “through free, over-the-air
television”).
45. See id. (indicating sole ownership allows NFL to sell bundled telecast
feeds).
46. See Sunday Ticket I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121354, at *7 (summarizing
there are designated time slots for games on Sundays, so networks alternate every
week to have to right to air game for given time slot).
47. See id. at *8 (acknowledging DirectTV recieves feeds directly from CBS or
Fox).
48. See id. at *7–8 (explaining without subscribing to Sunday Ticket, viewers
have access to at most six games “in any given week in any one market”).
49. For further discussion of the district court decision, see infra notes 50–52
and accompanying text.
50. See Sunday Ticket I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121354, at *39–40, 54–55, 60
(reasoning Plaintiffs failed to show how inflated prices from exclusive distribution
deal harms competition, Plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not
purchase directly from NFL, Plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege existence of market that Defendants have control to restrict competition). The district court engaged in a different analysis than the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Compare id.
at *20–25 (utilizing rule of reason test to analyze separate components of agreement), with Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d at 1152 (rejecting Defendants’ argument
court must analyze both (horizontal, vertical) components of agreement). The
district court analyzed the horizontal and vertical agreements separately, as opposed to the Ninth Circuit’s holistic approach. Compare Sunday Ticket I, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 121354, at *25 (analyzing vertical component before separately analyzing horizontal component), with Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d at 1152 (“Contrary to
the defendants’ argument, we are required to take a holistic look at how the interlocking agreements actually impact competition.”). In analyzing the potential for
anti-competitive harm stemming from the vertical agreement, the court held that
the agreement did not appear to reduce output. See Sunday Ticket I, 2017 U.S. Dist,
LEXIS 121354, at *32–37 (distinguishing National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma by stating “there is not a similar blanket
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lower court held that Plaintiffs both failed to allege and establish a
cognizable antitrust injury and failed to sufficiently support their
claims by facts bearing on Defendants’ intent.51 Additionally, the
district court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend.52
Accordingly, Plaintiffs appealed, and the Ninth Circuit examined the lower court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ the Section
1 and Section 2 claims under the Sherman Act.53 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissals and concluded Plaintiffs’
cause of action survived Defendants’ motion to dismiss.54 Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Defendants filed a Motion to Stay
Issuance of the Mandate Pending a Petition for Writ of Certiorari.55
The court granted Defendant’s motion and Defendants filed their
rule or policy that altogether prevents the television broadcast of certain games”).
In analyzing the horizontal agreement, the court dismissed any potential for anticompetitive harm because the horizontal agreement required cooperation to sell
collectively owned intellectual property. See id. at *41, 48 (finding “NFL’s conduct
in collectively working with its constituent teams to enter into exclusive broadcast
agreements of game footage collectively owned by the NFL and its teams . . . is not
an unreasonable restraint on trade”). While the district court found the plaintiffs
have standing to challenge the vertical agreement because they purchased directly
from DirectTV, the court notes how the plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge the horizontal agreement because they are an indirect purchaser. See id. at
*49–55 (holding Plaintiffs lacked standing since they are not direct purchasers of
Sunday Ticket); see also Kingray, Inc. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d
1177, 1199 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (“The [Supreme] Court held than an indirect or remote purchaser lacks standing to seek damages against the manufacturer for alleged violations of federal antitrust laws.”). Last, the district court explained that
since the NFL offers free broadcasts of local games, they lack the control to artificially raise prices. See Sunday Ticket I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121354, at *59 (“Accordingly, . . . Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged the existence of a market in
which Defendants have the power to control pricing or in which selling the rights
on the open market would prevent artificially inflated pricing.”).
51. See Sunday Ticket I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121354, at *62–65 (stating Plaintiffs conceded Section 1 claim is dependent upon Section 2 claim’s success). The
district court stated that Plaintiffs cannot allege injury to competition because the
horizontal agreement requires cooperation. See id. at *63 (holding Plaintiffs
“failed to adequately plead antitrust injury”). Furthermore, the district court reasoned the plaintiffs failed to establish intent because they did not allege any facts
indicating “predatory conduct.” See id. at *64 (stating having “practical monopoly”
is insufficient for alleging conspiracy to monopolize); see also Great Escape, Inc. v.
Union City Body Co., 791 F.2d 532, 541 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he mere intention to
exclude competition and to expand one’s business is not sufficient to show a specific intent to monopolize.”).
52. See Sunday Ticket I, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121354, at *65–67 (determining
Plaintiff’s pleadings are legally insufficient, so any attempt to amend them would
contradict current allegations).
53. For further discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s review of the lower court’s
judgment, see infra notes 165-201 and accompanying text.
54. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d at 1144 (concluding Plaintiffs have stated
cause of action under Sherman Act).
55. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2019), stay granted, In re NFL
Antitrust Litig., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 30822, at *3 (9th Cir. Oct. 16, 2019) (No.
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Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Supreme Court.56 The Chamber of Commerce, Antitrust Law and Business School Professors,
Economists, and Expert Antitrust Economist filed brief amici curiae
in support of petitioners NFL and DirectTV.57
The Supreme Court denied certiorari, but not because the Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s legal analysis.58 In his
detached opinion, Justice Kavanaugh explained the Supreme Court
denied certiorari because it was “at the motion-to-dismiss stage, and
the interlocutory posture is a factor counseling against this Court’s
review at this time.”59 The Supreme Court is reluctant to take on a
case where the factual record has not been established through discovery.60 Consequently, the case is now back in the Central District
of California where the parties have agreed to a trial date of February 20, 2024, subject to the district court’s approval.61
III. BACKGROUND
In order to fully understand the potential implications of this
case, it is necessary to understand the relevant historical and legal
backdrop.62 While the NFL fought legal battles and engaged in extensive lobbying efforts to enjoy exemptions from the Sherman Antitrust Act, Sunday Ticket is still generally subject to antitrust law.63
Accordingly, it is also necessary to analyze and assess each of the
17-56119) (“[T]he case is stayed until January 8, 2020, to permit appellees to file a
petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.”).
56. See Leonard, supra note 30 (acknowledging NFL’s petition to Supreme
Court has gained popularity amongst economists).
57. See id. (observing brief amici curiae all agree Ninth Circuit should have
used full rule of reason test rather than quick look test).
58. See Babler & McKeown, supra note 23 (noting Supreme Court is less likely
to accept cases decided at motion to dimiss stage, before discovery or further factual development)
59. See Nat’l Football League v. Ninth Inning, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 56, 57 (2020)
(Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari)) (noting Court may have
granted certiorari if factual record had been established since Court must assume
plaintiff’s factual allegations are true).
60. See Abbott v. Veasey, 137 S. Ct. 612, 613 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., statement
respecting denial of certiorari) (emphasizing importance of establishing factual
records before granting certiorari).
61. See Gardner, supra note 26 (stating while trial is approximately three years
away, it may affect league’s negotiations with TV networks, streamers).
62. For further discussion of the relationship between the NFL and the Sherman Antitrust Act, see infra notes 63-165 and accompanying text.
63. For further discussion of the NFL’s interaction with antitrust law, see infra
notes 65–88 and accompanying text.
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tests under applicable antitrust law to understand the import of the
Ninth Circuit’s decision.64
A. NFL’s Turbulent History with Antitrust Laws
For most of its existence, the NFL and its teams have enjoyed a
federal exemption from antitrust laws through the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 (“SBA”).65 Prior to the SBA’s enactment, the
federal government sought an injunction against the NFL and its
teams.66 The predicate for this action was an agreement between
the NFL and its constituent teams to cooperate in producing telecasts of games as well as share the broadcast revenues.67
In United States v. National Football League, the government argued the agreement violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.68 Section 1 states “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be
illegal.”69 Judge Grim of the District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania found the media agreement limited out-of-market
games and the NFL’s ability to veto contracts had the illegal effect
of territorial restraints amounting to a Section 1 violation.70 While
64. For further discussion of applicable antitrust law tests under the Sherman
Act, see infra notes 89–164 and accompanying text.
65. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 104 n.28 (1984) [hereinafter NCAA] (“[E]xemption demonstrates Congress’ recognition that agreements among league members to sell television rights
in a cooperative fashion could run afoul of the Sherman Act.”).
66. See United States v. Nat’l Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 321 (E.D. Pa.
1953) [hereinafter NFL I] (explaining government’s institution of suit against NFL
for alleged violations of Sherman Antitrust Act), superseded by statute, Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-331, § 1, 75 Stat. 732, as recognized in Shaw v.
Dall. Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 301 (3d Cir. 1999).
67. See NFL I, 116 F. Supp. at 330 (arguing Article X of by-laws violated Sherman Act because it restricts game output).
68. See id. at 321–22 (advocating Article X violates Sherman Act because “(1)
It prevents the telecasting of outside games into the home territories of other
teams on days when the other teams are playing at home. (2) It prevents the telecasting of outside games into the home territories of other teams on days when the
other teams are playing away from home and permitting the telecast of their
games into their home territories. (3) It prevents the broadcasting by radio of
outside games into the home territories of other terms [sic] both on days when the
other teams are playing at home and on days when the other teams are playing
away from home and are permitting the games to be broadcast or televised into
their home territories. (4) It gives the Football Commissioner an unlimited
power to prevent any and all clubs from televising or broadcasting any or all of its
or their games. Since the facts in reference to each of these provisions present
somewhat different anti-trust law problems, they will be considered separately.”).
69. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1 (LexisNexis 2021).
70. See NFL I, 116 F. Supp. at 326–27 (finding prohibition on selling broadcast
rights into another team’s home market when other team was playing at home was
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the decision did not mark the end for the NFL’s push for antitrust
exemptions, it was certainly a significant blow.71 Concern grew
amongst NFL officials that by allowing unrestricted business competition among the teams for telecast rights, the financial inequalities
between the losing and winning teams would greatly increase and
therefore weaker teams would struggle to stay in business.72 This
concern could potentially culminate in the NFL’s collapse.73 Such
a scenario was possible because the losing teams would keep losing
without the ability to pay for talented players.74
Rather than appealing Judge Grim’s decision, the NFL took a
political route, lobbying Congress to carve out an exception for the
NFL within the Sherman Act.75 At the time, NFL Commissioner
Pete Rozelle was disgruntled by the American Football League and
its ability to package and sell its eight teams’ telecast rights to ABC
in 1960.76 Commissioner Rozelle lobbied to New York Congressman Emanuel Cellar to propose a bill allowing the NFL to market
its broadcast rights as a league package, evenly spreading the broadcasting revenues among the teams.77 Congressman Cellar, Chairreasonable restraint on broadcast rights). However, the court did not agree with
the NFL’s justifications to restrict the sale of rights into another market when there
was not another team physically playing within that market. See id. at 326 (“[T]he
testimony of defendants’ witnesses consistently indicates that the primary reason
for the restrictions in this situation actually is to enable the clubs in the home
territories to sell monopoly rights to purchasers of television rights to away
games.”).
71. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d 1136, 1154 (9th Cir. 2019) (observing NFL
had to abandon its exclusive joint agreement with CBS to allow teams to engage in
individual contracts).
72. See NFL I, 116 F. Supp. at 323–24 (summarizing when it comes to earning
profit from business transactions, teams in professional sports league must not
“compete too well with each other”).
73. See id. (suggesting losing teams would never be able to compete, so eventually league would shrink to only winning teams).
74. See id. (“If all the teams should compete as hard as they can in a business
way, the stronger teams would be likely to drive the weaker ones into financial
failure . . . . There are always teams in the League which are close to financial
failure. Under these circumstances it is both wise and essential that rules be
passed to help the weaker clubs in their competition with the stronger ones and to
keep the League in fairly even balance.”).
75. See Evan Weiner, Sports Should Celebrate Emanuel Cellar Day, SPORTS TALK
FLA. (Sept. 29, 2020), https://sportstalkflorida.com/mlb/sports-should-celebrateemanuel-cellar-day/ [https://perma.cc/9Z2Q-58VJ] (acknowledging Rozelle lobbied team owners to convince them they can make more money through joint
agreement).
76. See id. (stating Rozelle also wanted to make NFL like MLB, which did not
have to abide by antitrust laws—instead could package its eighteen teams’ telecast
rights to sell them to cable network).
77. See Evan Weiner, NFL 100: Kennedy and Cellar Helped Create the Modern NFL,
SPORTS TALK FLA. (July 17, 2019), http://sportstalkflorida.com/nfl/https-wp-me-
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man of the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on AntiTrust and Monopoly, played an essential role in getting the bill
through the House.78 On September 30, 1961, President Kennedy
signed the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 into law.79
Under the SBA, antitrust law “shall not apply to any joint agreement [involving] organized professional team sports of football,
baseball, basketball or hockey . . . in the sponsored telecasting of
the games of football, baseball, basketball or hockey.”80 The SBA
effectively overruled Judge Grim’s decision and exempted the NFL
and the teams’ agreement from the Sherman Act, allowing them to
pool their telecast rights into a single package and share broadcast
revenues.81 While the SBA exempted the NFL from restrictions
against joint agreements for sponsored telecasting, it did not affect
other antitrust laws’ applicability to other activities like satellite
broadcasting.82 More recently—with the advancement of technology and different ways for fans to watch their favorite teams play—
the SBA’s exemption demonstrated controversy surrounding the
purpose and effect of the act.83 The availability of the games and
the price the league charged cable companies garnered attention
among fans and politicians.84
In 2006, Senator Arlen Specter spearheaded Senate Judiciary
Committee hearings to determine if the NFL Network and Sunday
Ticket violated antitrust laws.85 Without making any conclusions or
p81oan-1n3o/ [https://perma.cc/HXN5-87W7] (discussing $9.1 million deal with
CBS motivated Rozelle to lobby Congressman Cellar to get bill through House).
78. See id. (reporting Senator Estes Kefauver introduced similar bill, helped
get it passed through Senate).
79. See id. (describing SBA’s significant impact on granting each team substantial revenues).
80. See Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1291 (LexisNexis 2021).
81. See Mid-South Grizzlies v. Nat’l Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 775 (3d
Cir. 1983) (finding exemption is only applicable to joint sale of telecast rights).
82. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 1294 (LexisNexis 2021) (stating SBA does not “otherwise
affect the applicability or non-applicability of the antitrust laws” outside scope of
telecast rights).
83. See Len Pasquarelli, Sen. Spector Taking Aim at NFL Antitrust Exemption,
ESPN (Dec. 7. 2006), https://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?id=2690171 [https:/
/perma.cc/BV4M-T5NM] (advocating exemption should not give NFL ability to
enter into exclusive deals that could harm consumers).
84. See Steven Malanga, Bench the NFL: The League Enjoys an Antitrust Exemption
from Washington That Should Have Been Revoked Years Ago, CITY J. (Sept. 28, 2017),
https://www.city-journal.org/html/bench-nfl-15465.html [https://perma.cc/
2BJV-PAR9] (arguing as NFL became more prosperous, it used its exemption privileges to enter into exclusive contracts less favorable for consumers).
85. See Competition in Sports Programming and Distribution: Are Consumers Winning: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 109-762 (2006) (statement of Hon. Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on Judiciary) (acknowledging
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taking formal actions, Chairman Specter stated the NFL Network
and Sunday Ticket “implicates” antitrust laws and that there should
be more hearings to determine if there are any violations.86 However, there were no further hearings for Sunday Ticket.87 Even
though bipartisan calls to revoke or modify the SBA never gained
significant traction, the NFL’s satellite broadcasting deal with
DirectTV to produce Sunday Ticket is not exempt under the Sherman Antitrust Act and is therefore subject to its provisions.88
B. The Sherman Antitrust Act and Antitrust Standards of Review
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 prohibits “every
contract, combination . . ., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States.”89 Since a literal reading of
the act effectively makes every agreement between producers or
buyers illegal, because all agreements restrain trade in some way,
the Supreme Court clarified that the Sherman Act’s prohibitions
apply only to those contracts or combinations which “unreasonably” restrain competition.90 Congress designed the Act “to be a
comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving
free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.”91 The policy
behind the Act was that competition within an activity’s economic
market should be unrestrained.92 Thus, Section 1 of the Sherman
real purpose of hearings was to analyze NFL Network but added in review of Sunday Ticket because Comcast claimed it was excluded from bidding for Sunday
Ticket).
86. See S. REP. NO. 109-369 at 63 (2006) (noting both NFL Network, Sunday
Ticket appear to give NFL excessive market control).
87. See id. at 62 (observing some cable providers did not offer NFL Network in
their basic packages, causing some consumers to pay a premium while other cable
companies provided it in their basic package).
88. See Shaw v. Dall. Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir.
1999) (“The subscription satellite broadcast of games is not a part of the NFL’s
rights to the sponsored telecasting of those games and therefore not within the
Sports Broadcasting Act’s exemption to the antitrust laws.”).
89. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2020).
90. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (advancing Section 1 “is literally all-encompassing”); see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1, 88 (1911) (reviewing Congressional intent; determining Congress intended
Sherman Act to prohibit “only such contracts as were in unreasonable restraint of
trade”).
91. See N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 4 (suggesting Sherman Act was enacted to
promote healthy competition, provide free market for consumer).
92. See id. (“[T] unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality
and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conductive to the preservation of our democratic political and social
institutions.”).
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Act purported to maintain healthy competition in a free market to
benefit and protect consumers.93
In order to state a Section 1 claim under the Sherman Antitrust Act, plaintiffs must plead four separate elements.94 First, the
plaintiff must show the existence of some conspiracy among multiple parties.95 Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant or defendants entered into an agreement with the specific intent to
harm interstate commerce.96 Third, the plaintiff must show the
agreement between defendants “actually injures competition.”97
Lastly, plaintiffs must have antitrust standing by showing the defendants’ anti-competitive behavior caused plaintiffs harm.98
While the Sherman Act forbids only unreasonable restraints of
trade, the Supreme Court extended the Act’s prohibitions to include presumptively unreasonable restraints if its effect on competition is “pernicious” or otherwise unjustified by “any redeeming
virtue.”99 Accordingly, the Supreme Court acknowledged two standards of review for Section 1 claims, the “per se rule” and the “rule
of reason” test.100 However, there is a third standard of review that
sometimes does not garner distinction for being its own standard
because it is an abbreviated form of the rule of reason test called
the “quick look” test.101
93. For further discussion of the Sherman Act, see supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
94. See generally Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d 1136, 1150 (9th Cir. 2019) (stating
pleading standard for Section One claim under Sherman Act).
95. See id. (finding Section 1 is limited to unreasonable contracts despite its
facially broad applicability to all contracts).
96. See Brantley v. NBC Universal, 675 F.3d 1192, 1197 (9th Cir. 2012) (requiring plaintiffs to show intent “to harm or restrain trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations”).
97. See Oltz v. St. Peter’s Cmty. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1988)
(acknowledging this element requires defined product plus geographic market).
98. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d at 1150 (requiring plaintiffs to show they “are
the proper parties to bring the antitrust action because they were harmed by the
defendants’ contract, combination, or conspiracy, and the harm they suffered was
caused by the anti-competitive aspect of the defendants’ conduct”).
99. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (“[T]here are
certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
have caused or the business excuse for their use.”).
100. For further discussion of the per se rule, see infra notes 119–127 and
accompanying text. For further discussion of the rule of reason test, see infra notes
102–118 and accompanying text.
101. For further discussion of the quick look test, see infra notes 128–164 and
accompanying text.
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1. The Rule of Reason Test
The Supreme Court gave life to the rule of reason test in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States.102 There, the plaintiff, a commodities trader, claimed that the defendant, the Board of Trade,
imposed a business policy that restrained trading certain commodities by requiring buyers to freeze their bids from the close of day
until the beginning of the next.103 Ruling in favor of the defendant, the Supreme Court held that restraints that simply regulate
and promote competition are lawful, while suppression of competition was unlawful.104 The Court stated that courts must consider
the nature of the particular business in question and how a given
restraint has affected that business.105 Ruling in favor of the defendant, the Supreme Court held the policy was a reasonable restraint
of business.106
The post-Chicago Board of Trade landscape left lower courts with
little guidance in balancing factors to determine if a restraint on
trade is unreasonable.107 While the balancing tests complicate
courts’ analysis, the basic pleading elements of the rule of reason
test are quite simple.108 In essence, the plaintiff must plead a prima
102. See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ( “The
legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as
whether it restrains competition.”).
103. See id. at 237–38 (summarizing purpose of call rule was “to promote the
convenience of members by restricting their hours of business and to break up a
monopoly in that branch of the grain trade acquired by four or five warehousemen
in Chicago”).
104. See id. at 238 (“The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it
is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.”); see also Am. Needle, Inc. v.
Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010) (“When ‘restraints on competition
are essential if the product is to be available at all,’ per se rules of illegality are
inapplicable, and instead the restraint must be judged according to the flexible
Rule of Reason.”).
105. See Chi. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238 (“[A] court must ordinarily consider
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.”).
106. See id. at 239–41 (discussing how call rule is reasonable because restraints
relating to business hours are common—they actually promote competition effects
in this case by increasing amount paid to farmers without raising price for
consumers).
107. See Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 11–12
(1984) (discussing factors Supreme Court gave lower courts in Chicago Bd. of Trade
are too rigid, so they cannot adequately consider myriad of competing interests
coupled with mass amounts of evidence).
108. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d 1136, 1150 (9th Cir. 2019) (discussing four
elements plaintiff must plead in order to state claim under Section 1 of Sherman
Act).
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facie case, adducing sufficient evidence to satisfy all four elements
of a Section 1 claim.109 The element of anticompetitive harm is the
hardest element to plead.110 In order to sufficiently plead anticompetitive harm, plaintiffs must show a relevant market, defendant’s
control of that market, and that the restraint is likely to have a anticompetitive effect in that market.111 Plaintiffs often struggle to
prove a relevant market or they define the market too narrowly.112
Once the plaintiff pleads a prima facie violation of Section 1,
the defendant bears the burden of offering procompetitive justifications for the restraint under review, and if the defendants fails to
plead any procompetitive justifications, the analysis stops there in
favor of plaintiff.113 Recent studies show that 97% of such Section 1
claims fail because plaintiffs cannot establish the element of
harm.114 Furthermore, when plaintiffs sufficiently plead harm and
defendants sufficiently offer procompetitive justifications, plaintiffs
have only prevailed in about 1% of full-blown rule of reason
cases.115
To promote efficiency and avoid complex and costly legal analysis, courts typically eschew complete rule of reason analyses in
favor of alternative methods.116 Courts have employed the per se
rule and the quick look test in an attempt to deter anticompetitive
behavior while simultaneously making it easier for plaintiffs to state
109. For further discussion of the requirements of alleging a prima facie Sherman Antitrust Act violation, see supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
110. For further discussion of the element of anticompetitive harm, see infra
notes 112–115 and accompanying text.
111. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d at 1151 (ruling market control is essential
for proving defendant’s ability to implement restraints that would not be possible
in competitive market).
112. See James T. McKeown, The Economics of Competitive Balance: Sports Antitrust Claims After American Needle, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 517, 530 (2011) (describing reasoning commonly used by defendants—when plaintiff narrowly defines
market, defendant market power is overstated, therefore insufficient to prove anticompetitive harm).
113. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d at 1150–52 (explaining procedure of pleading Section 1 claim).
114. See Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st
Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 828 (2009) (discussing results of study on all
rule of reason cases decided 1999 through mid-2009).
115. See id. (acknowledging results from same study; emphasizing how defendants won 221 out of 222 full-blown rule of reason cases).
116. See Alan J. Meese, In Praise of All or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why
Antitrust Law Should Reject the Quick Look, 104 GEO. L.J. 835, 836 (2016) (considering development of alternative standards of review, how they have potential to give
less accurate determinations which increase litigation costs).
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a Section 1 claim.117 However, this good-faith effort to engage in
alternative cost-saving methods has resulted in additional costs in
applying the ambiguous quick look test and overruling previous activities deemed to be per se illegal.118
2.

The Per Se Rule

The Supreme Court declared some types of agreements per se
illegal, meaning the court need not engage in a detailed analysis of
market conditions and can condemn the activity in question as automatically illegal under the Sherman Act.119 In other words, the
Supreme Court applies the per se rule when “the practice facially
appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output.”120 Nonetheless, the plaintiff
still has to plead the four elements of a Section 1 claim before a
court will apply the per se rule.121 When pleading the anticompetitive effect element, the plaintiff must satisfy their burden by showing evidence of an agreement to restrict output or fix a price.122
After a court finds the arrangement at issue per se illegal, that
arrangement is presumptively unreasonable without inquiry into
the market in which the arrangement is found.123 However, the
Supreme Court carved out an exception by holding the per se rule
inapplicable to horizontal restraints on competition where the horizontal restraints are vital to a product’s availability.124 Thus, when a
Section 1 claim is brought against a joint venture or other pro-com117. See id. (noting efficiency that is supposed to come from alternative methods of review is diminished by lack of Supreme Court guidance on how to apply
quick look, per se rules).
118. For further discussion of the per se rule, see infra notes 119–127 and
accompanying text. For further discussion of the quick look test, see infra notes
128–164 and accompanying text.
119. See Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)
(“[A]greements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive
that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality.”).
120. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20
(1979) (declining to apply per se rule to blanket licensing agreement necessary to
avoid engaging in “thousands of individual negotiations”).
121. For further discussion of the four elements of a Section 1 claim, see
supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
122. See NCAA, 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.28 (1984) (dismissing plaintiff’s attempt to
show anticompetitive harm by alleging agreement to restrict output is illegal per
se).
123. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (summarizing
how per se rule avoids “complicated and prolonged investigation into entire history of industry involved”).
124. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101–02 (noting restraints can widen consumer
choice by allowing marketing of materials that would be difficult to produce without cooperation).
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petitive arrangement where restraints are necessary to the existence
of that arrangement, a court should apply the rule of reason test.125
Furthermore, the Supreme Court found league sports like the NFL
are activities that can only be carried out jointly and, therefore, the
per se rule is inapplicable to a sports league policy or restraint.126
Accordingly, league sports must be evaluated under the rule of reason test or the quick look test.127
3.

The Quick Look Test

While there is no universally accepted definition of the quick
look test, the Supreme Court equated it more closely to a sliding
scale were “there is generally no categorical line . . . between restraints that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and those that call for more detailed treatment.”128
The quick look test is the Supreme Court’s attempt to strike a balance between conduct that is not per se illegal and conduct that “an
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics
could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”129 The Supreme
Court appeared to blend the per se rule with the rule of reason test
by requiring the defendant to offer pro-competitive justifications if
a court finds the defendant’s conduct to have anticompetitive effects.130 If the defendant succeeds, the court then determines
whether the defendant could achieve its asserted pro-competitive
justifications through less restrictive means.131
The Supreme Court developed the quick look test in National
Collegeiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents132 where the Supreme Court rejected the use of the per se rule.133 In that case, the
125. See id. (“[Some] activities can only be carried out jointly.”).
126. See id. at 103 (describing why unfairness would exist if courts applied per
se rule to sports leagues).
127. See id. at 101 (describing sports broadcasting as industry where “horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all”).
128. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 780–81 (1999)
(noting quick look test can lead to misleading results).
129. See id. at 770 (observing quick look test is applicable where there is great
likelihood of anticompetitive effects).
130. See id. at 769–70 (citing NCAA, 468 U.S. at 110) (requiring defendants to
offer procompetitive justification when their conduct has great likelihood of anticompetitive effects).
131. See Meese, supra note 116, at 838 (discussing procedural burden shifting,
subsequent analysis of quick look test).
132. NCAA, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
133. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101 (holding per se rule is inapplicable where
“horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available
at all”).
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NCAA imposed three restrictions on its conferences and its eightytwo teams.134 The first restriction was that the conferences and its
teams were required to have television exposure.135 The second restriction was that the conferences and its teams were limited in the
number of times they would appear on television.136 The third restriction was that the individual schools had to negotiate their television deals, but the aggregate payment to all schools had to be at
least $131.75 million.137
The Supreme Court reasoned the NCAA’s justification that the
restrictions preserved a competitive balance was meritless because
the restrictions are “not related to any neutral standard or to any
readily identifiable group of competitors.”138 Notably in NCAA,
Plaintiffs failed to allege a properly defined market in which defendants have market power.139 By holding the “naked restraint on
price and output requires some competitive justification even in the
absence of a detailed market analysis,” the Supreme Court set the
foundation for a standard of review that attempts to balance the
approaches taken under the per se rule and the rule of reason
test.140 Additionally, in its effort to strike a balance, the NCAA
Court discussed joint selling agreements and how they make “a new
product by reaping otherwise unattainable efficiencies.”141 The
NCAA, however, was not engaged in a joint selling arrangement
134. See id. at 94 (summarizing restrictions NCAA places on member institutions).
135. See id. (noting how restriction would last two years).
136. See id. (recounting teams were limited to appear on television no more
than six times per year).
137. See id. at 92–94 (dismissing NCAA statement explaining television policy
restrictions as intended to reduce adverse effects of live television upon football
game attendance); see also Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1293 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (“Thus, NCAA creates a
single eligible buyer for the product of all but the two schools selected by the
network having first choice. Free market competition is thus destroyed under the
new plan.”).
138. See, e.g., Blubaugh v. Am. Cont. Bridge League, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3178, at *48–49 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 18, 2004) (“Facially neutral rules that prohibit
cheating are essential to promote fair competition and to preserve the integrity of
the game.”); see NCAA, 468 U.S. at 118 (reasoning there is no evidence to show
restrictions produced any greater measure of equality).
139. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 (“[T]he absence of proof of market power
does not justify a naked restriction on price or output.”); see also Nat’l Soc. of Pro.
Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (holding plaintiffs do not have to
show market power when restraint is illegal per se).
140. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 110 (disregarding petitioner’s argument stating
restrictions cannot have anticompetitive effect because petitioner has no market
power).
141. See id. at 113 (observing joint selling agreements eliminate individual
sales by members of joint selling arrangement).
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because it did not act as a selling agent for any of the college
teams.142 The Court noted the hallmarks of a joint selling arrangement consist of a packaged product that no individual could offer.143 Accordingly, the Supreme Court reasoned the NCAA’s
broadcast plan did not qualify as a joint selling arrangement because there is no pooling of rights and only a restriction on minimum price.144
In Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists,145
the Supreme Court underwent a similar analysis by requiring procompetitive justifications in the absence of the market control requirement.146 In that case, a dental practice refused to provide patient records to insurance companies who were attempting to
approve coverage for its clients.147 The Court found the dental
practice’s conduct had an anticompetitive effect because it impaired “the ordinary give and take of the marketplace.”148 The
Court held the anticompetitive effect was “legally sufficient to support a finding that the challenged restraint was unreasonable even
in the absence of elaborate market analysis.”149
The decisions in NCAA and International Fedederation of Dentists
culminated in the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement of the quick
look test in California Dental Association v. Federal Trade Comission.150
There, the California Dental Association (“CDA”) banned any advertisement of discounts and any advertisements of quality of ser142. See id. (acknowledging sale of individual games plus terms of particular
agreements are left to individual schools to negotiate subject to some limitations
imposed by NCAA); see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441
U.S. 1, 23 (1979) (noting individual teams remained free to enter into agreements
without any restrictions imposed).
143. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 114 (suggesting under NCAA plan, individuals are
responsible for selling their own rights to produce televised game).
144. See id. at 113 (speculating if NCAA sold blanket license covering all of
teams broadcasting rights, outcome on its joint selling arrangement argument
might have come out differently).
145. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
146. See id. at 460–61 (rejecting defendants’ contention that proof of market
power was necessary satisfy pleading requirements).
147. See id. at 452 (rejecting petitioner’s argument they were allowed to withhold records under Indiana law).
148. See id. at 459 (finding petitioner’s conduct limited consumer choice); see
also Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (acknowledging ordinary market fluctuation is essential for consumers to compare prices).
149. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 461 (emphasizing anticompetitive effect was factual finding, not presumed fact, on motion to
dismiss).
150. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999)
(summarizing “what has come to be called abbreviated or ‘quick-look’ analysis
under the rule of reason” analysis).
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vices amongst its 19,000 members.151 Before getting to the
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit applied the quick look test to
both restrictions and concluded they were naked restraints on output.152 The Supreme Court reversed, finding the CDA’s restrictions may have pro-competitive effects by protecting the
consumer.153 Furthermore, the Court reasoned the Ninth Circuit
failed to consider the defendant’s procompetitive justifications,
thus eliminating the balanced approach the quick look test provides through burden-shifting.154 The Supreme Court held that
where there is plausibility of competing claims about the effects of a
restriction, there cannot be an obvious anticompetitive effect and
therefore the quick look test does not apply.155 By officially endorsing the quick look test, the Supreme Court suggested the lower
courts engage in “an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint” to determine if a restriction requires a more detailed review or an abbreviated one.156
In Texaco Inc. v. Dagher,157 the Supreme Court reviewed application of the per se rule and the quick look test to a joint venture.158 In that case, two oil companies engaged in a joint venture
to refine and sell gasoline.159 Plaintiffs charged the oil companies
151. See id. at 759–60 (detailing dentists all agreed to CDA’s code of ethics).
152. See id. at 764 (announcing Ninth Circuit determined restrictions to be
naked restraint output).
153. See id. at 773 (“[R]estrictions arguably protecting patients from misleading or irrelevant advertising call for more than cursory treatment as obviously comparable to classic horizontal agreements to limit output or price competition.”); see
also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364–65 (1977) (discussing justifications exist for advertising ban).
154. See Cal Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 773–74 (“The Court of Appeals might, at
this juncture, have recognized that the restrictions at issue here are very far from a
total ban on price or discount advertising, and might have considered the possibility that the particular restrictions on professional advertising could have different
effects from those ‘normally’ found in the commercial world, even to the point of
promoting competition by reducing the occurrence of unverifiable and misleading
across-the-board discount advertising.”).
155. See id. at 780–81 (“[As the circumstances here demonstrate,] [t]here is
generally no categorical line to be drawn between restraints that give rise to an
intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and those that call for more
detailed treatment.”).
156. See id. at 780 (reasoning judges who engage in quick look test must “explain the logic of their reasoning”).
157. Texaco v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2006) (holding quick look test is inapplicable to challenges against joint venture’s core activity).
158. See id. at 7 n.3 (“[F]or the same reasons that per se liability is unwarranted
here, we conclude that petitioners cannot be held liable under the quick look
doctrine.”).
159. See id. at 3 (announcing while both companies were able to sell joint
venture oil individually, it would not have made difference if they sold it through
one entity).
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with a price-fixing conspiracy and argued it was per se illegal under
Section 1 and illegal under the quick look test.160 A joint venture
exists where “persons who would otherwise be competitors pool
their capital and share the risks of loss as well as the opportunities
for profit.”161
The Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiff’s argument and reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to apply the per se rule and
quick look test to joint ventures.162 Relying on NCAA, the Supreme
Court held the per se rule and quick look test are inapplicable
where the business practice being challenged “involves the core activity of the joint venture itself.”163 The Supreme Court reasoned a
joint venture’s core activity is to establish restrictions around the
goods it produces and sells.164
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
Before reviewing Plaintiffs’ Section 1 claim, the Ninth Circuit
described the history of television broadcasting of NFL games to
assume the SBA did not apply to “non-exempt channels of distribution” like cable television and satellite television.165 Furthermore,
Defendants did not argue that the SBA applies to the NFL-Teams
Agreement or the NFL-DirectTV Agreement.166 After eliminating
the argument that the agreements under question could be exempt
under the SBA, the Ninth Circuit chose NCAA as the governing
case.167
160. See id. at 3–4 (discussing procedural history of case, including district
court’s holding full blown rule of reason analysis applies to joint ventures, but
recognizing Ninth Circuit’s reversal on grounds per se rule applies to joint
ventures).
161. See id. at 6 (advocating joint ventures are procompetitive business structures); see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979)
(“When two partners set the price of their goods or services they are literally ‘price
fixing,’ but they are not per se in violation of the Sherman Act.”).
162. See Texaco, 547 U.S. at 7 (observing plaintiffs did not alternatively argue
full blown rule of reason analysis).
163. See id. at 7–8 (noting joint ventures are not unlawful where agreement
on restriction is necessary to market product).
164. See id. (acknowledging fixing price for good or service is essential to any
joint venture).
165. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d 1136, 1147–49 (9th Cir. 2019) ( “[T]he
NFL’s collective sale of telecast rights to free, over-the-air television networks was
squarely covered by the SBA.”). For further discussion of the history of the SBA
and NFL broadcasting, see supra notes 65–84 and accompanying text.
166. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d at 1149 (reporting NFL-Networks Agreement is exempt from Antitrust law under SBA).
167. See id. (claiming network plan in NCAA is similar to NFL’s agreements).
But see NCAA, 468 U.S. 85, 92–94 (1984) (declaring network plan is for college
sports, whereas individual teams enter into their own television contracts).
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A. Section 1 Claim
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the NFL-Teams Agreement and
NFL-DirectTV Agreement under the “rule of reason” test to determine if “restraint of trade is unreasonable.”168 The Ninth Circuit
maintained that “[i]n order to state a Section 1 claim under the
rule of reason [test], [P]laintiffs must plead four separate elements.”169 While Defendants did not dispute the first two elements
of a Section 1 claim, they argued the Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently
allege an injury to competition and antitrust standing.170
1.

Third Element: Injury to Competition

In analyzing whether Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged injury to
competition element, the Ninth Circuit applied the quick look test
where “a restraint injures competition if [it] plausibly allege[s] ‘a
naked restriction on price or output,’ such as ‘an agreement not to
compete in terms of price or output.’”171 The court concluded the
NFL-Teams and NFL-DirectTV Agreements work together to impose a naked restraint on output because “the interlocking agreements in this case involve the same sorts of restrictions
that NCAA concluded constituted an injury to competition.”172 The
Ninth Circuit emphasized four similarities to NCAA that guided the
court to its conclusion.173
First, the complaint in NCAA was similar to Plaintiff’s complaint because they both alleged the restriction of telecasts to one
168. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d at 1150 n.5 (finding per se standard of review is inapplicable to league sports because teams must cooperate to bring about
football game).
169. See id. at 1150 (“[P]laintiffs must plead facts which, if true, will prove: (1)
a contract, combination or conspiracy among two or more persons or distinct business entities; (2) by which the persons or entities intended to harm or restrain
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations; (3) which
actually injures competition.”). The Ninth Circuit stated of the fourth element:
“the plaintiffs must plead antitrust standing, meaning they must allege that (4)
they are the proper parties to bring the antitrust action because they were harmed
by the defendants’ contract, combination, or conspiracy, and the harm they suffered was caused by the anti-competitive aspect of the defendants’ conduct.” Id.
170. See id. at 1150–51 (acknowledging Plaintiffs’ failure to show market
power). For further discussion of the element of injury to competition, see infra
notes 171-189 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the element of
antitrust standing, see infra notes 190-200 and accompanying text.
171. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d at 1151 (suggesting complaint alleges analogous restriction to what plaintiffs alleged in NCAA). But see NCAA, 468 U.S. 85,
92–94 (1984) (rejecting restraints stemming from policy, not joint agreement).
172. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d at 1152 (emphasizing interlocking agreements are not exempt by SBA).
173. See id. at 1151–52 (reasoning NCAA should govern case). For further
discussion of the four points, see infra notes 174-177 and accompanying text.
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per game.174 Second, no NFL team was “permitted to sell its telecasting rights independently.”175 Third, there was a horizontal restraint on competition because the Teams-NFL Agreement
required the individual teams to vote on the ratification of licensing
deals.176 Lastly, Plaintiffs’ complaint properly alleged a naked restriction on number of telecasts available, comporting with the Supreme Court’s definition of output in NCAA.177
In response to the court’s use of the quick look test, Defendants argued the agreements should be analyzed separately because
horizontal agreements were analyzed under the per se rule and vertical agreements were analyzed under the rule of reason test.178
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, relying on NCAA to hold the rule of
reason test applies to horizontal and vertical agreements in league
sports cases.179 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit relied on National
Society. Of Professional Engineers to hold that courts must take a holistic approach to analyze how interrelated agreements affect competition.180 Applying the holistic approach, the court concluded “that
the complaint adequately pleads that the vertical NFL-DirecTV
Agreement works in tandem with the Teams-NFL Agreement to”
restrict output and therefore restrain competition.181
Defendants also argued Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the third element of injury to competition because Plaintiffs did not allege “a
174. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d at 1151 (announcing even though NCAA
involved single agreement, interlocking agreements in this case impose similar limitations). But see NCAA, 468 U.S. at 92–94 (discussing restraints come from policy
teams are required to follow to compete in NCAA divisions).
175. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d at 1151 (summarizing in NCAA, individual
teams were able to contract their own deals but were subject to limitations).
176. See id. at 1152 (arguing since individual teams vote to ratify broadcasting
agreement which would limit their ability to independently contract, teams are
agreeing not to compete).
177. See id. (explaining output means total number of telecasts available for
broadcaster or consumers to view or purchase); see also NCAA, 468 U.S. 85, 99
(1984) (defining output as “the quantity of television rights available for sale”).
178. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d at 1152 (reasoning Defendants improperly
relied on In re Musical Instruments & Equipment Antitrust Litigation because case
“does not require a court to break down an alleged conspiracy into its constituent
parts”).
179. See id. (citing NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101–03) (holding per se rules are inapplicable to league sports because they require cooperation).
180. See id. (advocating holistic approach will reveal whether challenged restraint enhances or restricts competition); see also Nat’l Soc’y Of Pro. Eng’rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (“[A]greements . . . can only be evaluated
by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the
reasons why it was imposed.”).
181. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d at 1153 (speculating agreements to pool
rights before vertically licensing them can constitute Section 1 violation).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol29/iss1/3

24

Oakley: Sunday Ticket: The Ninth Circuit's Expansion of the Quick Look Te

2022]

SUNDAY TICKET

109

properly defined market in which defendants have market
power.”182 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument on the
grounds the quick look test did not require pleading a properly
defined market.183 The rejection of Defendants’ argument rested
on the notion that a reasonable observer could ascertain and identify a naked restriction on output’s anticompetitive effects.184
Since Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged injury to competition, the
burden shifted onto the Defendants to show pro-competitive benefits.185 Defendants argued the restrictions were pro-competitive because cooperation and consent between the NFL and opposing
teams were required for producing the telecasts.186 The court rejected Defendants’ cooperation argument because no precedent requires cooperation between the NFL and NFL teams to produce
and release telecasts.187 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit reinforced its
rejection of Defendants’ argument for cooperation because before
the SBA, individual teams owned its telecast rights and many teams
unilaterally licensed telecasts of its own games to different networks.188 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held the Plaintiffs sufficiently stated an injury to competition by plausibly alleging a naked
restraint on the output of telecasts per game.189
182. See id. at 1155 (“Defendants argue that the complaint failed to plausibly
allege that they have market power in either the market for live video presentations of regular season NFL games or the submarket for out-of-market game
broadcasts.”).
183. See id. (acknowledging there are no substitute for NFL games, so NFL
must have effective control over market including NFL telecasts of games).
184. See id. at 1156 (“[A]n observer with even a rudimentary understanding of
economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”). Since plaintiffs plausibly alleged
a naked restraint, they satisfied the quick look test and therefore did not need to
allege market control. See id. at 1156 (holding plaintiffs have “not failed to allege
market power”).
185. For further discussion of who has the burden to show anticompetitive
harm or pro-competitive benefits, see supra notes 109–115 and accompanying text.
186. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d at 1153 (“Each NFL game broadcast is a
copyrighted work jointly authored by the NFL, the two competing teams, and the
broadcast network, and the agreement of all participants is necessary in order to
create the telecasts at all.”). But see Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560
U.S. 183, 187 (2010) (explaining each NFL team has its own intellectual property
in form of names, colors, and logos).
187. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d at 1153–54 (“In the absence of a legal requirement that the NFL teams, NFL, and broadcasters coordinate in filming and
broadcasting live games, the Los Angeles Rams (for instance) could contract for
their own telecast of Rams games and then register the telecasts for those games
with the Rams (and perhaps the team against whom they are playing.”).
188. See id. at 1154 (finding thirteen teams had signed telecast agreements
with CBS or NBC prior to SBA’s enactment).
189. See id. at 1155 (reasoning Defendants limited amount of telecast available to consumers without regard for consumer demands). Defendant also argued
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2. Fourth Element: Antitrust Standing
In analyzing whether Plaintiffs lacked antitrust standing to
challenge the Teams-NFL Agreement, the Ninth Circuit applied
traditional negligence principles of causation to permit injured antitrust plaintiffs to file suit against any co-conspirators.190 The
Ninth Circuit held the plaintiffs had proper antitrust standing by
alleging direct injury from the NFL, teams, and DirecTV as co-conspirators.191 In response, the dissent and Defendants argued this
co-conspirator exception cannot apply in this case because the
Ninth Circuit limited the exception to price-fixing conspiracies in
ATM Antitrust Fee Litigation.192
The dissent argued the Plaintiffs were required to use a passthrough theory to recover damages because, unlike a price-fixing
conspiracy where overcharge was not passed on to consumers, a restraint on output conspiracy would require the court to engage in
the exact complex calculations the Supreme Court sought to avoid
in Illinois Brick.193 The dissent highlighted that Plaintiffs only alleged that “DirectTV has set an artificially high consumer price.”194
that “the NFL-DirecTV agreement did not reduce the output of NFL game broadcasts.” See id. (rejecting Defendants’ argument output was not reduced since “all
NFL Sunday-afternoon games are broadcast somewhere”). However, as the Ninth
Circuit already reasoned, that is not the correct definition of output according to
the Supreme Court in NCAA. See id. (“NCAA indicated that the relevant output is
‘the total amount of televised intercollegiate football,’ available to consumers.”).
190. See id. at 1156 (reporting Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) “established a
bright-line rule that authorizes suits by direct purchasers but bars suits by indirect
purchasers”). The Ninth Circuit illustrated how the principles of proximate cause
operate for antitrust standing: “ ‘manufacturer A sells to retailer B, and retailer B
sells to consumer C, then C may not sue A.’ However, ‘C may sue B if B is an
antitrust violator.’ ” See id. (quoting Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1521
(2019)) (announcing “ ‘principles of proximate cause’ . . . apply differently when
the injury to plaintiff is caused by a multi-level conspiracy to violate antitrust laws”).
191. See id. at 1157 (finding these allegations are sufficient to survive motion
to dismiss); see also Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1521 (2019) (discussing
there is no intermediary in distribution because plaintiff purchased apps directly
from alleged antitrust violator).
192. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d at 1157 (reasoning Ninth Circuit explicitly
limited exception to price-fixing conspiracies).
193. See id. at 1159–61 (Smith, J., dissenting) (reasoning pass-on theory involves distributor paying manufacturer overcharged anti-competitive price for distribution rights, then passing on overcharged price to consumers to recoup
overpayment to manufacturer). The dissent notes how restraint on output conspiracies would require courts to “determine how much of the consumer price
stems from ordinary market forces, and how much of it stems from the distributor’s efforts to recoup its overpayment to the manufacturer.” See id. at 1161–62
(considering majority opinion inappropriately invites courts to make calculations
“sought to be avoided in Illinois Brick”).
194. See id. at 1161 (Smith, J., dissenting) (discussing calculating damages
would require court to engage in analysis prohibited by Illinois Brick).
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The dissent noted how this allegation would require a court to engage in a pass-on theory of damages to determine if DirectTV overpaid for the telecast rights, how much DirectTV would have had to
pay if not for the NFL-Teams Agreement, and how much overcharge DirectTV passed on to consumers.195
The court rejected the dissent’s and Defendants’ arguments
because they failed to offer a reason as to why the court should
distinguish price-fixing from output conspiracies.196 In response to
the dissent’s argument regarding the pass-on theory of damages for
output conspiracies, the majority held that courts need only compare current consumer prices to those existing within a competitive
market.197 However, the dissent highlighted the lack of clarity and
inherent difficulties in determining differences of prices within and
outside competitive markets without simultaneously considering
overcharge.198 In response to Defendants’ and the dissent’s argument, the Ninth Circuit relied on Cal. Dental Ass’n to hold “pricefixing conspiracies are functionally indistinguishable from outputrestricting conspiracies” because they have the same anti-competitive effects.199 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held Illinois Brick was
inapplicable and Plaintiffs have antitrust standing because they “suffered antitrust injury due to this conspiracy to limit output.”200
195. See id. at 1161–62 (Smith, J., dissenting) (noting courts are prohibited
from “creat[ing] a new exception to the Illinois Brick rule”); see also In re ATM Fee
Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 741, 754 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[U]nder the co-conspirator
exception recognized in this circuit, the price paid by a plaintiff must be set by the
conspiracy and not merely affected by the setting of another price.”).
196. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d at 1158 n.9 (claiming dissent fails to give
reasoned basis for distinguishing price-fixing conspiracies from output restriction
conspiracies).
197. See id. at 1157 n.7 (“A court would not need to determine to what extent
the NFL overcharged DirecTV; it would need to consider only the prices consumers paid compared to the prices that would have existed in a competitive
market.”).
198. See id. at 1161 n.4 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is unclear how in practice
a court could consider what the theoretical consumer price would have been in a
competitive market (absent the NFL’s horizontal agreement) without considering
whether and how much of an overpayment DirecTV made.”).
199. See id. at 1158 (majority opinion) (arguing conspiracy to fix higher price
achieves same result as conspiracy to limit output because price will rise to limit
demand of reduced supply). But see id. at 1160 n.3 (Smith, J., dissenting) (emphasizing Cal. Dental “stands only for the uncontested proposition that a conspiracy to
price fix and a conspiracy to restrict output both injure consumers by arbitrarily
raising the price they pay for a product” but “says nothing about whether a particular consumer’s injury is direct or indirect, or which consumers are authorized to
seek judicial redress”).
200. See id. at 1158 (reporting Defendants failed to provide a reason for distinguishing between price-fixing conspiracies versus output restricting conspiracies).
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V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In the wake of its decision, the Ninth Circuit erroneously lowered the standard of review for antitrust claims by expanding the
quick look test to joint selling arrangements’ or joint ventures’ core
business activity.201 The NFL has jointly produced and marketed its
telecasts ever since it received antitrust exemption from the SBA
sixty years ago.202 As technology advanced and the demand for
football grew, the NFL formed a joint venture for satellite broadcasting in the form of the Sunday Ticket to reach a new realm of
viewers .203
Under the Ninth Circuit’s new framework in applying the
quick look test, the unprecedented and abbreviated standard of review applied to a joint venture’s core product and thereby relieved
Plaintiffs’ burden of pleading anticompetitive harm within a defined market.204 Accordingly, plaintiffs bringing Section 1 claims
against joint ventures in the Ninth Circuit need only establish antitrust standing and plead the existence of an agreement that restrains competition without showing anticompetitive harm.205 The
court erred in its sweeping decision to vastly reduce antitrust pleading requirements because the quick look test was inapplicable to
Sunday Ticket II, and because the court’s most relied upon case was
distinguishable from this case.206 This section discusses the inapplicability of the quick look test to Sunday Ticket II and distinguishes
this case from NCAA, the case the Ninth Circuit relied on to apply
the quick look test to joint ventures.207
201. For further discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s expansion, see infra notes
202-214 and accompanying text.
202. For further discussion of Commissioner Rozelle’s lobbying efforts in
Congress for exemptive relief, see supra notes 75–84 and accompanying text.
203. See Dade Hayes, AT&T Is Letting Non-Subscribers Stream NFL Sunday Ticket,
DEADLINE (Aug. 14, 2020), https://deadline.com/2020/08/in-a-first-att-is-lettingnon-subscribers-stream-nfl-sunday-ticket-1203013890/ [https://perma.cc/EJN6MVT7] (suggesting there are millions of subscribers for NFL Sunday Ticket, plus
AT&T’s decision to let non-DirectTV subscribers stream Sunday Ticket will lead to
more viewers).
204. For further discussion of how the quick look test relieves plaintiff from
completing the pleading requirements, see supra notes 128–164 and accompanying text.
205. For further discussion of the Ninth’s Circuit’s reasoning and holding,
see supra notes 165-200 and accompanying text.
206. For further discussion of the inapplicability of NCAA and the quick look
test, see infra notes 209–224 and accompanying text.
207. For further discussion of differences between NCAA and Sunday Ticket II,
see infra notes 216–224 and accompanying text.
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A. Inapplicability of the Quick Look Test to NFL’s Sunday
Ticket
The quick look test was inapplicable to Sunday Ticket because
it was a joint venture consisting of a horizontal agreement to pool
intellectual property rights between the NFL and the NFL teams
and a vertical agreement to license those packaged rights to
DirectTV to create Sunday Ticket.208 Sunday Ticket qualified as a
joint venture because it was a packaged product that no individual
team could produce by itself.209 The quick look test should not be
applied to a joint venture’s core activity because an agreement on
restriction was necessary to market the product where it would be
infeasible to produce or market the product.210
In this case, the core activity of the NFL teams, NFL, and
DirectTV joint venture was to restrict output by packaging broadcasting rights to create a unique product.211 The Ninth Circuit improperly expanded the quick look test by deviating from Supreme
Court precedent that the per se rule and quick look test were inapplicable where the challenged business practice “involves the core
activity of the joint venture itself.”212 Established antitrust law holds
a joint venture’s core activity should be reviewed under the fullblown rule of reason analysis.213 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit improperly expanded the scope of the quick look test and, consequently, made the Ninth Circuit the most antitrust plaintiff-friendly
jurisdiction.214
B. Improper Reliance on NCAA
The Ninth Circuit improperly relied on NCAA to find an agreement between a professional sports league and its teams about how
208. For further discussion of how the agreements work in tandem to create a
core product of a joint venture, see supra notes 5–12 and accompanying text.
209. See NCAA, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984) (explaining joint selling arrangement
involves pooling of rights, then selling agent who markets blanket license of those
rights).
210. See Texaco v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2006) (acknowledging how joint
ventures are procompetitive business structures because they provide products that
otherwise would not exist).
211. See id. (finding restrictions on price or output are an essential element of
joint ventures).
212. See id. (suggesting per se rule or quick look test could both apply to joint
venture’s non-core activities).
213. See id. (requiring joint ventures’ core activities to be reviewed under full
rule of reason analysis because legitimate business collaboration requires discretion on how to price, sell products).
214. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 780 (1999) (observing legal
scholar who developed quick look test cautioned against misleading results).
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to market its product was a restriction that may be deemed anticompetitive without an “elaborate industry analysis.”215 In its analysis,
or lack thereof, the Ninth Circuit’s decision to have NCAA control a
claim against the core activity of a joint venture case was misplaced
because the Supreme Court stated NCAA could only be applied to
joint ventures when the claim was against a “nonventure activit[y].”216 Additionally, the business activity at issue in NCAA was
strikingly different from the business activity in Sunday Ticket II.217
Unlike the restraint in NCAA involving an agreement to limit
the output of telecasts to no more than six appearances per team,
the agreement at issue in this case does not set a maximum amount
of times a team can appear on television.218 The NCAA’s network
plan established the number of games a conference may televise
and set a minimum price without the NCAA’s participation or oversight in producing or licensing the games.219 In effect, the NCAA
was not acting as a selling agent, but rather was establishing output
and price limitations without any collaboration among teams or increased efficiencies because the individual teams had to negotiate
and enter into their own network contracts.220
In this case, the NFL and its teams restricted output to efficiently collaborate with each other by pooling their intellectual
property rights and packaging them to create a unique product for
millions of people enjoy.221 Not only was the Ninth Circuit applying non-joint venture analysis to a joint venture case, but the Ninth
Circuit was also ignoring the vast differences between the network
plans of both cases.222 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on
215. See Sunday Ticket II, 933 F.3d 1136, 1155–56 (2019) (considering use of
quick look test without referring to it as quick look test).
216. See Texaco, 547 U.S. at 7 (suggesting policies on prices, sales are core
activity of any joint venture, so any claim of anticompetitive harm on core activity
of joint venture must be done through full-blown rule of reason analysis).
217. For further discussion of how the NCAA’s business activity at issue is different than the NFL’s, see infra notes 218-223 and accompanying text.
218. See NCAA, 468 U.S. 85, 94 (1984) (“Under the appearance limitations no
member institution is eligible to appear on television more than a total of six times
and more than four times nationally, with the appearances to be divided equally
between the two carrying networks.”).
219. See id. (“The number of exposures specified in the contracts also sets an
absolute maximum on the number of games that can be broadcast.”).
220. See id. at 113–14 (“Thus, the effect of the network plan is not to eliminate individual sales of broadcasts, since these still occur, albeit subject to fixed
prices and output limitations.”).
221. For further discussion of how the agreements work in tandem to create a
core product of a joint venture, see supra notes 5–12 and accompanying text.
222. For further discussion of differences, see supra notes 215-223 and accompanying text.
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NCAA to apply the quick look test to this case is erroneous and the
court should have applied a full-blown rule of reason analysis.223
VI. IMPACT
The impact of the Ninth Circuit’s decision is two-fold.224 First,
the unfavorable ruling and future litigation could put the NFL at a
disadvantage for finding a host for Sunday Ticket, unless the new
host provides a less exclusive platform than DirecrtTV.225 Second,
by lowering the pleading standards for antitrust claims, the Ninth
Circuit made it easier for plaintiffs to coerce defendants to the settlement table through costly discovery.226 The following sections
will discuss how the Ninth Circuit’s decision impacts the NFL and
media negotiations, and antitrust defendants engaging in joint ventures generally.227
A. Impact on Sunday Ticket Negotiations
After the Supreme Court’s denial to hear the case, this case is
now back to the district court in the Central District of California
where the parties have agreed to a trial date of February 20,
2024.228 While there is plenty of time for the parties to agree to a
settlement, the renewal of media contracts continues to loom over
the NFL.229 The NFL has to make a decision to keep the Sunday
Ticket exclusive to one provider or sell the package to multiple
carriers.230
Historically, the NFL has had most of the bargaining power
over media contract negotiations because they are the highest-rated
223. See Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7 (2006) (stating per se rule, quick
look test are both inapplicable where challenged business practice “involves the
core activity of the joint venture itself”).
224. For further discussion of Sunday Ticket II’s impact on Sunday Ticket and
antitrust litigation, see infra notes 226–243 and accompanying text.
225. For further discussion of the impact on media negotiations and potential
complications in continuing to provide similar product to consumers, see infra
notes 229–235 and accompanying text.
226. For further discussion of Sunday Ticket II’s potential effects on joint ventures, see infra notes 236-243 and accompanying text.
227. For further discussion of how the Ninth Circuit’s decision may affect
NFL-network agreements and joint ventures, see infra notes 228-243 and accompanying text.
228. See Gardner, supra note 26 (speculating settlement could happen before
trial because parties will have plenty of time for discovery).
229. See id. (noting trial date is years away because court schedules are backed
up from COVID-19).
230. See id. (reporting different TV networks, streamers want to get involved
in Sunday Ticket deal).
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programming in television.231 However, a future trial date that has
the potential to find Sunday Ticket in violation of antitrust laws
gives bidders like Amazon, ESPN+ and Apple+ leverage in negotiations for streaming Sunday Ticket on their platforms since they are
not exclusive like DirectTV.232 In fact, the NFL is considering innovating the distribution of Sunday Ticket by keeping the satellite
portion with DirectTV and selling the streaming rights to online
platforms like Amazon Prime or Apple+.233 The NFL is even considering allowing viewers to purchase access to all of the out of market games for a single team.234 Overall, these contract renewal
negotiations coupled with the threat of antitrust violations could
force the NFL to completely adjust how consumers watch football,
potentially giving viewers the options to watch out-of-market games
on different platforms like streaming services and television
networks.235
B. Should Joint Ventures be Concerned about the Ninth
Circuit’s Decision?
Since the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Section 1 plaintiffs challenging joint ventures will most likely proceed to discovery.236 This has
far reaching implications for antitrust litigation because antitrust
discovery is the most extensive and expensive compared to other
231. See Marchand, supra note 15 (acknowledging NFL’s bargaining power
has allowed it to substantially increase its contracts every renewal period).
232. See Andrew Marchand, The NFL Sunday Ticket sweepstakes may have a dark
horse candidate, NEW YORK POST (Nov. 22, 2021), https://nypost.com/2021/11/22/
hbo-max-emerges-as-dark-horse-player-for-nfl-sunday-ticket/ [https://perma.cc/
QS7B-CQMC] (suggesting NFL is expected to finalize its media rights deal for Sunday Ticket in earlier half of 2022); see also Alex Sherman, Amazon Likely Front-Runner for Multiyear NFL Sunday Ticket Deal, Sources Say, CNBC (Sept. 10, 2021), https:/
/www.cnbc.com/2021/09/10/amazon-likely-front-runner-for-multi-year-nfl-sunday-ticket-deal-sources.html [https://perma.cc/A2CR-W6H9] (considering digital
platform would make Sunday Ticket less exclusive, which would attract more
subscribers).
233. See Mike Florio, DirectTV May Keep Satellite Piece of Sunday Ticket, NBC
SPORTS (Oct. 21, 2021), https://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2021/10/21/
directv-may-keep-satellite-piece-of-sunday-ticket/ [https://perma.cc/28J4-JFCJ]
(observing NFL’s desire to maximize reach of Sunday Ticket).
234. See Mike Florio, Brian Rolapp: Sunday Ticket is “ripe for innovation”, NBC
SPORTS (Oct. 13, 2021), https://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2021/10/13/
brian-rolapp-sunday-ticket-is-ripe-for-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/Z2D6LUQN] (announcing NFL is considering whether viewers can purchase games by
team, week, or single games).
235. See Bassam, supra note 18 (speculating possibility of selling Sunday Ticket
to multiple carriers).
236. For further discussion of how the Ninth Circuit lowered pleading standards against joint ventures, see supra notes 201-223 and accompanying text.
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claims.237 Thus, by lowering the preliminary merit inquiry of a
plaintiff’s claim, the Ninth Circuit made it easier for plaintiffs to
bring Section 1 claims against joint ventures and subject defendants
to extraordinary discovery costs.238 Discovery costs loom over defendants and give plaintiffs leverage in getting the defendant to the
settlement table because it would be cheaper to settle than fully
litigate antitrust claims.239 As a result of the coercive nature of discovery costs, it is no surprise that most antitrust cases settle.240
Overall, joint ventures should be concerned about the Ninth
Circuit’s decision because it makes them more vulnerable to expensive discovery costs that could coerce them into settlement.241
While the Ninth Circuit covers the State of California, joint ventures around the country should be concerned because a plaintiff
can bring an antitrust claim against a company in any federal district it does business in.242 The Ninth Circuit’s decision has altered
the national antitrust landscape, making it easier for plaintiffs to
bring claims against joint ventures and subsequently leverage them
into a settlement without proving the joint venture harmed
competition.243
Matthew Oakley*
237. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (suggesting discovery costs for defendants in antitrust litigation is especially costly because all
relevant information is in their possession).
238. See id. (advocating courts must be diligent in reviewing dismissal of antitrust claims because they are subject to discovery abuse).
239. See id. at 557–58 (noting significance of pleading standards is to prevent
plaintiff from taking up defendant’s time or resources in effort to coerce
settlement).
240. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 285 (3d ed. 2006) (“As would
be expected, a large percentage (70–88%) of antitrust cases are settled.”).
241. For further discussion of how joint ventures are more vulnerable to discovery costs and settling antitrust claims, see supra notes 236-240 and accompanying text.
242. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 22 (LexisNexis 2021) (“Any suit, action, or proceeding
under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought not only in the
judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may
be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases may be served in the
district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.”).
243. For further discussion of how the Ninth Circuit made it easier for plaintiffs to bring Section 1 claims, see supra notes 201-214 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate Class of 2022, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; Tremendous thanks to my friends, family, and mentors, but especially to my
late mother, Lisa, who was my biggest supporter throughout my athletic and academic career.
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